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I. INTRODUCTION
With increasing frequency, hackers target large corporations., While fi-
nancial gain appears to drive many of these hackers, some recent high-profile
security breaches are apparently motivated by politics.2 As this new brand of
"hacktivist" ascends, will the First Amendment permit businesses to pursue
any remedies against publishers of their stolen data? On November 24, 2014,
Sony Pictures Entertainment (Sony) became one of the latest victims of polit-
ically-motivated hackers.3 The hackers, who called themselves "the Guardi-
ans of Peace," did not initially make their motivations clear.4 On December
8, 2014, however, the hackers linked the attack to the impending release of
the Sony film "The Interview," a comedy about the assassination of North
Korean dictator Kim Jong-un.5 As part of the attack, the hackers leaked a
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I. See Tali Arbel, Top Business Stories of 2014: US Grows, World Slows, F-
NANCE.YAHOO.COM (Dec. 22, 2014, 5:39 PM), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/
top-business-stories-2014-us-grows-world-slows-I 85010987-finance.html
(showing in 2014 alone, hackers attacked Target, Home Depot, Kmart, and
Dairy Queen, to name just a few targets).
2. See David E. Sanger & Nicole Perlroth, U.S. Said to Find North Korea Or-
dered Cyberattack on Sony, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2014, at Al, http://www
.nytimes.com/2014/12/18/world/asia/us-links-north-korea-to-sony-hacking
.html.
3. Ellen Nakashima, Why the Sony Hack Drew an Unprecedented U.S. Response




4. See Nicole Perlroth, Sony Pictures Computers Down for a Second Day After
Network Breach, N.Y. TIMES: BITS BLOG (Nov. 25, 2014, 7:08 PM), http:I/
bits.blogs.nyimes.com/2014/11/25/sony-pictures-computers-down-for-a-sec-
ond-day-after-network-breach/?_r-0.
5. See Brooks Barnes & Nicole Perlroth, As More Documents Appear, Sony Seeks
to Calm Nervous Employees, N.Y. TIMEs (Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.nytimes
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massive amount of internal, confidential Sony documents. 6 The hackers re-
leased the documents by uploading them to anonymous posting websites,
such as Pastebin, and then separately emailing journalists and media outlets
to provide them with access.7 In addition to leaking employee addresses, So-
cial Security numbers, performance reviews, and other types of personal in-
formation, the hackers also provided the media access to many other
documents.8 These documents included financial data and embarrassing in-
ternal emails sent by Sony executives.9 For instance, in one of the more scan-
dalous exchanges, Sony producer Scott Rudin called Angelina Jolie "a
minimally talented spoiled brat."o
In response to the leaks, Sony attorney David Boies sent a threatening
letter to would-be media publishers of the stolen information.II In the letter,
Boies warned that, should media outlets disclose the stolen information,
Sony would "hold [them] responsible for any damage or loss arising from ...
use or dissemination" of the documents.12 In response to the Boies letter and
citing the First Amendment, Eugene Volokh, a professor at UCLA School of




7. See Michael Cieply & Brooks Barnes, Sony Pictures Demands That News
Agencies Delete 'Stolen' Data, N.Y. TIMEs (Dec. 14, 2014), http://www.ny-
times.com/2014/12/15/business/sony-pictures-demands-that-news-organiza-
tions-delete-stolen-data.html; see also Guardians of Peace (GOP) Release
Sony CEO Outlook Data File with Threat to Movie Goers, GEEK SLOP (Dec.
16, 2014), http://geekslop.com/2014/guardians-peace-gop-release-sony-ceo-
outlook-data-file-threat-movie-goers (the Guardians of Peace did not make the
documents available to the general public, as they password-protected their
document drops).
8. Id.
9. See Barnes & Perlroth, supra note 5; see also Amanda Holpuch, Sony Email
Hack: What We've Learned About Greed, Racism, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 15,
2014), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/dec/I4/sony-pictures-
email-hack-greed-racism-sexism.
10. Holpuch, supra note 9.
11. See Ben Fritz, Sony Tells Media Not to Use Leaked Documents, WALL ST. J.
(Dec. 14, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sony-tells-media-not-to-use-
leaked-documents- 1418602529.
12. David Boies, Letter from Gen. Counsel, Sony Pictures Entm't, to Gen. Coun-
sel, The Hollywood Reporter (Dec. 14, 2014), available at http://www.holly
woodreporter.com/sites/default/files/custom/Sony%20Letter.pdf.
13. Eugene Volokh, Can Sony Sue Media Outlets Who Publish the Stolen Sony
Documents?, WASH. POST: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 15, 2014), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/12/15/can-sony-
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rect? The answer to this question will have broad implications for businesses
across the country, especially as hacktivism becomes more common. To an-
swer this inquiry, this comment probes the history of the First Amendment
issues involved and discusses how current law would apply to Sony's predic-
ament. In the end, Sony probably has a stronger legal argument than Profes-
sor Volokh suggests. There are, however, strong ethical and prudential
reasons why Sony might not want to pursue remedies against media publish-
ers of its stolen information. Nevertheless, courts should not interpret (and
have not interpreted) the First Amendment to leave victims of cybercrime
without any remedy to mitigate damages caused by the disclosure of their
private, stolen information.14
II. HISTORY OF THE ISSUE
A. When (and When Not) to Apply Strict Scrutiny: N. Y. Times Co. v.
United States and Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart
An early case, N. Y. Times Co. v. United States-commonly known as
the Pentagon Papers case-discusses freedom of speech in the context of
publishing stolen information.15 Although the facts of the Pentagon Papers
case differ from the facts of the Sony incident,16 the Supreme Court has re-
lied on the Pentagon Papers case to address issues directly on point.17 In the
Pentagon Papers case, the United States attempted to enjoin the New York
Times and other media outlets from publishing classified documents includ-
ing a study called the "History of the U.S. Decision-Making Process on'Viet
Nam Policy."18 The New York Times had "unauthorized possession" of the
classified documents, which had been illegally leaked.19 The New York
Times argued, however, that the First Amendment forbade the Government
from issuing a "prior restraint" against publishing the materials.20
The Supreme Court agreed with the New York Times.21 One plurality
stated, "[A]ny prior restraint on expression comes to this Court with a 'heavy
sue-media-outlets-who-publish-the-stolen-sony-documents/; but see id. (ac-
knowledging that courts could go either way).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press.").
15. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971).
16. In this comment, the "Sony incident" refers to the hacking, release of docu-
ments, and reaction described in the Introduction.
17. See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 528 (2001).
18. N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 714.
19. Id. at 750-51 (Burger, J., dissenting).
20. Id. at 723 (Douglas, J., concurring).
21. The Supreme Court's decision includes a short per curiam opinion and six
concurring opinions. Id. at 714 (6-3 decision) (Black, J., concurring).
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presumption' against its constitutional validity."22 Although the various opin-
ions differ in their reasoning, a majority recognized that the speech, relating
to the misconduct of the United States during war, was particularly valuable
to the public.23 Famously, Justice Potter Stewart wrote, "[T]he only effective
restraint upon executive policy and power in the areas of national defense
and international affairs may lie in an enlightened citizenry-in an informed
and critical public opinion which alone can here protect the values of demo-
cratic government."24 On the other hand, at least five Justices also recognized
the value of keeping certain matters private.25 Justice Stewart, after praising
free speech, wrote, "In the area of basic national defense the frequent need
for absolute secrecy is, of course, self-evident."26 Indeed, Justice Stewart was
"convinced that the Executive [was] correct" in that the publication of certain
documents was not "in the national interest."27
This conviction was not enough, however, to justify restraining this par-
ticular speech prior to publication.28 The policies favoring application of the
First Amendment won, especially since the President was not seeking to en-
join the documents pursuant to any law passed by Congress.29 Interestingly,
although the information at issue in the Pentagon Papers may have been sto-
len, none of the Justices, apparently, considered this fact to be of any particu-
lar significance.30
While the Pentagon Papers case established much of the law that a court
would apply to the Sony incident, the Sony incident would address four dif-
ferent key questions. First, and most importantly, the Sony incident would
not be limited to an evaluation of a content-based, prior restraint of speech;
the Pentagon Papers case, by contrast, dealt only with a content-based, prior
restraint of speech.31 Although the Pentagon Papers case did not explicitly
say so, prior restraints on speech are generally subject to strict scrutiny under
the First Amendment.32 Furthermore, the Court especially reviews "content-
22. Id. at 723 (Douglas, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971)).
23. See id. at 728 (Stewart, J., concurring).
24. N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 728 (Stewart, J., concurring).
25. See id. at 728 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 754 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 728 (Stewart, J., concurring).
27. Id. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring).
28. See id. (Stewart, J., concurring).
29. See id. (Stewart, J., concurring).
30. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 528 (2001) (highlighting this fact).
31. See N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 730-31.
32. See Kyle Hawkins, Note, Gagging on the First Amendment: Assessing Chal-
lenges to the Reauthorization Act's Nondisclosure Provision, 93 MINN. L. REV.
274, 275 (2008) (noting that, under strict scrutiny, statutes must be "narrowly
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based" restrictions on speech using strict scrutiny.33 A majority of the Court
remained ambivalent, at least, about whether the same result in the Pentagon
Papers case would occur had the President been seeking either to punish the
newspapers post-publication or restrict publication pursuant to a generalized
statute passed by Congress. 34 Second, a court would be balancing signifi-
cantly different interests in the Sony incident than the Court was balancing in
the Pentagon Papers case. Arguably, an "enlightened citizenry" benefits more
from knowing the conduct of the U.S. government during the Vietnam War
than knowing what Rudin thinks about Jolie's acting ability.35 On the other
side of the scale, however, publication of the latter information-while it
might be embarrassing to Rudin and Jolie-will almost certainly not cause a
national security crisis. Third, while the information in the Pentagon Papers
case was possibly stolen, as noted above, the Court chose not to dwell on or
decide the significance of this fact.36 Finally, the Government itself was a
party in the Pentagon Papers case, whereas, in any future litigation relating to
the Sony incident, Sony would be trying to protect its own interests.
In order to analyze properly what a court would do if it were confronted
with the Sony incident, one must note that, even in speech cases applying
strict scrutiny, a private party seeking to restrict speech will not necessarily
lose.37 Indeed, Professor Matthew Bunker has noted, a court which analyzes
a strict scrutiny case has often functioned "feebl[y] in fact" when it comes to
attempts to regulate speech.38 Moreover, in certain situations, the courts will
sometimes lower the level of scrutiny of restrictions on speech, even when
dealing with a restriction arguably characterized as a prior restraint.39
tailored to a state interest of the highest order.") (quoting Fla. Star v. B.J.F.,
491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989)).
33. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 395-96 (1992).
34. See N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("Undoubtedly
Congress has the power to enact ... criminal laws to protect government prop-
erty and preserve government secrets.... Moreover, if Congress should pass a
specific law authorizing civil proceedings in this field, the courts would like-
wise have the duty to decide the constitutionality of such a law.").
35. Id. at 728 (noting that an informed public opinion protects the values of
democracy).
36. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 517 (2001).
37. See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 37 (1984).
38. Matthew D. Bunker, et. al., Strict in Theory, but Feeble in Fact? First Amend-
ment Strict Scrutiny and the Protection of Speech, 16 COMM. L. & POL'Y 349,
381 (2011) (playing off Professor Gerald Gunther's famous observation that
strict scrutiny is "'strict' in theory and fatal in fact").
39. Id.; Seattle Times Co., 467 U.S. at 33-34 (1984).
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For example, the Court lowered the level of scrutiny in Seattle Times
Co. v. Rhinehart.40 In Rhinehart, a religious group called the Aquarian Foun-
dation sued the Seattle Times for defamation.41 The Seattle Times had writ-
ten, among other thing, that chorus girls "wantonly danced naked" at an
event organized by the Aquarian Foundation.42 The Aquarian Foundation de-
nounced these allegations as "fictional and untrue."43 As part of discovery,
the Seattle Times requested a list of donors to the Aquarian Foundation over
the past ten years.44 The trial judge ordered discovery and, after initially hesi-
tating, placed the discovered documents under a protective order.45 The pro-
tective order forbade the Seattle Times from publishing any of the discovered
information.46 The Seattle Times appealed, alleging that granting the protec-
tive order violated the First Amendment free speech rights of the Seattle
Times.47
The Supreme Court agreed with the Aquarian Foundation, noting that
"the order did not apply to information gained by means other than the dis-
covery process."48 In so holding, the Court declined to apply strict scrutiny,
despite the fact that the order was, literally speaking, a "'prior restraint of
free expression.' "49 Instead, the Court considered: "whether the 'practice in
question [furthered] an important or substantial governmental interest unre-
lated to the suppression of expression' and whether 'the limitation of First
Amendment freedoms [was] no greater than [was] necessary or essential to
the protection of the particular governmental interest involved.' "50 In other
40. See Hawkins, supra note 32, at 288 ("Rhinehart ... represents the idea that
some nondisclosure statutes deserve less First Amendment scrutiny 'than
would restraints on dissemination of information in a different context.' ").
41. See Rhinehart, 467 U.S. at 22-23 (Rhinehart was the leader of the Aquarian
Foundation); Hawkins, supra note 32, at 288 ("Rhinehart ... represents the
idea that some nondisclosure statutes deserve less First Amendment scrutiny
'than would restraints on dissemination of information in a different
context.' ").
42. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. at 23.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 24.
45. Id. at 25-27.
46. Id. at 27.
47. Id. at 27-28.
48. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. at 27-28.
49. Id. at 28; but see id. at 33 (noting that the order was not "the kind of classic
prior restraint that requires exacting First Amendment scrutiny," because the
content of the speech was not restrained per se, just the information that was
gleaned through a certain method).
50. Id. at 32 (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974)).
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words, the Court applied some sort of intermediate scrutiny or an ad hoc
balancing test. 51
Although the Court's holding was not necessarily surprising,52 several
aspects of the decision apply to the Sony incident. First, the party seeking to
suppress the speech prevailed, despite the fact that, as the Court acknowl-
edged, the conduct of the Aquarian Foundation may have interested the pub-
lic.53 Second, as noted earlier, the Court applied intermediate scrutiny or an
ad hoc balancing test, rather than strict scrutiny.54 The Seattle Times argued
the protective order was a prior restraint of speech and that the restraint was
based on content. 55 The Supreme Court took issue with the Seattle Times'
characterization.56 The Court pointed out that the protective order did not
forbid disclosing any information obtained outside of the particular discovery
process. 57 The Court also noted that the discovery rule applied was a broad
rule and "a matter of legislative grace."58 There is no constitutional right to
obtain information in a certain way; accordingly, no constitutional right to
disclose information obtained in a particular way existed.59
The Court further opined that, because the order only suppressed speech
obtained in a certain way, the suppression of speech was "not the kind of
classic prior restraint that requires exacting First Amendment scrutiny."60 Fi-
nally, it is worth noting how the Rhinehart Court applied its intermediate
scrutiny test to the facts of this case. Although "certainly a public interest" in
knowing the information existed, the Court found that, because "the dissemi-
nation of this information would 'result in annoyance, embarrassment and
even oppression,' "-as it likely would in the Sony situation-the trial court
appropriately suppressed the information.61 Thus, based on the facts of
Rhinehart, the Court's version of intermediate scrutiny appears fairly easy to
overcome.62
51. See id.
52. After all, as the lower court observed, nothing less than "the integrity of [the]
discovery process" was at issue. Id. at 28 (citing Rhinehart v. Seattle Times
Co., 98 Wash. 2d 226 (1982), aff'd, 467 U.S. 20 (1984)).
53. See id. at 31.
54. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. at 32.
55. See id. at 30-31.
56. Id.
57. See id. at 27.
58. Id. at 32.
59. See id.
60. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. at 33.
61. Id. at 37 (quoting Rhinehart v. Seattle Times Co., 98 Wash. 2d 226, 227
(1982), aff'd, 467 U.S. 20 (1984)).
62. See id.
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B. Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'n Co. Line of Cases: Strong First
Amendment Protection for Publication of Legally Obtained,
Truthful Information
Notwithstanding cases like Rhinehart, the Supreme Court generally pro-
tects media outlets seeking to publish accurate information like the informa-
tion at issue in the Sony incident and, for that matter, Rhinehart.63 A good
example of this is the Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'n Co. line of cases.64 In
Smith, a newspaper, the Charleston Gazette, published the name of a minor
involved in an assault.65 In publishing this information, the newspaper di-
rectly defied a West Virginia statute that stated, "[Tihe name of any child, in
connection with any proceedings under this chapter, [shall not] be published
in any newspaper without a written order of the court . . . ."66 The Supreme
Court held that the statute was unconstitutional.67 The Court declined to de-
cide whether the statute constituted a "prior restraint," because any "penal
sanction for publishing lawfully obtained, truthful information" is subject to
strict scrutiny.68
The Smith Court relied in part on Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,
which struck down a statute forbidding publication of the names of rape vic-
tims.69 In Cohn, the Court reasoned, "By placing the information in the pub-
lic domain on official court records, the State must be presumed to have
concluded that the public interest was thereby being served."70 In other
words, the Court found the fact that the information was publically and le-
gally available to be significant, potentially rendering any application of both
Cohn and Smith to the information at issue in the Sony incident irrelevant.7'
The Smith line of cases perhaps reached its fullest expression in Florida
Star v. B.J.F.72 In Florida Star, a rape victim, B.J.F., sued the Florida Star for
violating her privacy interests by publishing her full name in an article.73
Specifically, she relied on a Florida statute, which prohibited publishing the
63. See Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 528 (1989); Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'n
Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
64. Smith, 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
65. Id. at 103.
66. Id. at 98 (quoting W. VA. CODE § 49-7-3 (1976)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
67. See id. at 105-06.
68. See id. at 101-02 (emphasis added).
69. See, e.g., id. at 102; Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 494 (1975).
70. Smith, 443 U.S. at 103 (quoting Cox Broad. Corp., 420 U.S. at 494 (1975))
(internal quotations marks omitted).
71. See id. at 103.
72. Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
73. See id. at 528.
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names of rape victims "in any instrument of mass communications."74 The
Florida Star legally obtained her name directly from the police department,
but published her name despite its own internal policy not to publish the
names of rape victims.75 The police department left a report on the incident in
the department's pressroom, which was unlocked and open to journalists.76 A
reporter-in-training used the report to write an article.77
The Supreme Court agreed with the Florida Star, holding that the Flor-
ida statute was unconstitutional as applied.78 The Court identified that this
case represents a conflict between a state statute protecting personal privacy
and the First Amendment protecting freedom of the press. 79 Before getting to
the heart of the opinion, the Court added a couple. of provisos applicable to
similar First Amendment cases.8 0 First, the Court noted that all such cases are
factually dependent and that the Court has, and will continue to, analyze
them on a case-by-case basis.8 ' Second, the Court expressly declined to hold
that "truthful publication may never be punished consistent with the First
Amendment."82 Moreover, and relevant to the Sony incident, the Court ex-
plicitly declined to address how the Court would rule when information is
"[un]lawfully obtained."83
Nevertheless, as observed above, the Court held that the statute was
unconstitutional.84 In so holding, the Court applied strict scrutiny.85 Under
the facts of this case, the Court held that a statute must be "narrowly tailored
to a state interest of the highest order."86 Before applying that test, however,
the Court held that, looking at the speech broadly, the news article certainly
pertained to a matter of public interest.87 After all, the article generated from
74. Id. at 526 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 794.03 (1987)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
75. See id. at 527.
76. Id.
77. See id.
78. See Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 526.
79. See id. at 530.
80. Id. at 530-32.
81. See id.
82. Id. at 532 (emphasis added).
83. Id. at 541.
84. See Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 541.
85. See id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 536-37.
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the report concerned an investigation into a recently-committed violent
crime.88
After holding that the speech taken as a whole indeed pertained to a
matter of public concern, the Court applied the strict scrutiny test. 89 Interest-
ingly, the Court agreed that protecting the identity of rape victims, "in a
proper case," probably could constitute a "state interest of the highest or-
der."90 The statute, however, as applied to these facts, clearly was not nar-
rowly tailored to this interest.91
In Florida Star, the government provided the information directly to the
media.92 A more direct way of protecting the privacy of rape victims would
be to prevent the government from disseminating the names of rape victims
in the first place.93 The Court worried that media outlets would begin to
"self-censor" for fear of liability from publishing information obtained di-
rectly and legally from the government.94 Finally, the Court also expressed
concern that the statute focused too narrowly on large media outlets when
individuals were just as capable of violating the privacy concerns of victims
of sexual assault.95
One must carefully define the limits of the Florida Star decision when
attempting to apply the decision to other incidents. First, the reasoning of the
Florida Star decision applies only to "lawfully obtained" information, unlike
the information from the Sony incident.96 Second, in Florida Star, the Court
applied strict scrutiny.97 As Rhinehart indicates, however, the Court, depend-
ing on the circumstances of the case, may not apply strict scrutiny.98 The
Florida Star Court relied extensively on Smith, in which the Court applied
strict scrutiny in part because the information at issue was "lawfully ob-
tain[ed]."99 Third, the holding of Florida Star indicates that the Court focuses
88. Id. at 537.
89. Id. at 537-38.
90. See Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 537-38.
91. See id. at 541.
92. See id. at 538.
93. See id. (quoting Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975)) ("Once
the government has placed such information in the public domain, 'reliance
must rest upon the judgment of those who decide what to publish or
broadcast[.]' ").
94. See id.
95. See id. at 540.
96. See Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 541.
97. See id.
98. See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 27 (1984).
99. See Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'n Co., 443 U.S. 97, 101 (1979).
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primarily on whether the statute is "narrowly tailored."100 Because the statute
was not narrowly tailored to achieve the end of protecting rape victims, the
statute failed to satisfy strict scrutiny.10
C. Bartnicki v. Vopper: Narrower than It Appears
In Bartnicki v. Vopper, the Supreme Court finally purported to apply the
Smith line of cases to information that was not "lawfully obtained."102 An
open question remains, however, as to how much the Court actually applied
the reasoning of Smith and its progeny to Bartnicki or would apply it to the
Sony incident. In Bartnicki, the Pennsylvania State Education Association, a
local teachers union, and the school board of the Wyoming Valley West High
School were engaged in highly contentious negotiations.103 In the heat of
these negotiations, an anonymous wire tapper illegally recorded a telephone
conversation between Anthony Kane, the president of the teacher's union,
and Gloria Bartnicki, the union's chief negotiator.104 In the conversation,
Kane spoke frankly about his negotiating opponents, even going so far as to
make violent threats.105 For instance, Kane at one point said, "If they're not
gonna [sic] move for three percent, we're gonna [sic] have to go to their,
their homes False [sic] [t]o blow off their front porches."o6 "We'll have to
do some work on some of those guys."107 Unfortunately for Kane and Bart-
nicki, the wire tapper placed the illicitly obtained recording in the mailbox of
Jack Yocum, the leader of an organization opposing the teacher's union.108
Yocum then gave the recording to Fred Vopper, a local radio personality.109
Vopper, who also opposed the union, played the recording on his show.'10
Kane and Bartnicki sued Vopper and others for violations of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2511(1)(c), which provides:
[Any person who] intentionally disclose[d] . . . to any other person
the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication, know-
ing or having reason to know that the information was obtained
100. See Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 541.
101. See id.
102. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 518 (2001).
103. See id.
104. Id. at 517-18.
105. In the Sony situation, none of the disclosed, stolen emails discussed violent
threats or illegal activities. See id. at 518-19.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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through the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communica-
tion in violation of this subsection; . . . shall be punished."'
The Court ruled in favor of Vopper, holding the statute invalid as applied to
the facts of the case.1 2 The Court acknowledged at the outset: "[T]hese cases
present a conflict between interests of the highest order-on the one hand,
the interest in the full and free dissemination of information concerning pub-
lic issues, and, on the other hand, the interest in individual privacy and, more
specifically, in fostering private speech."1i3 Furthermore, the Court accepted
that wiretapping was illegal and that, while Vopper did not participate in
making the recording, Vopper "had reason to know" that the recording was
being illegally obtained.114 While the Court did not say explicitly what kind
of scrutiny it was applying,'15 the Court proceeded to balance the interests at
issue in this case.116
The Court acknowledged that the privacy of communication is of ut-
most importance."7 Quoting President Lyndon Johnson's Commission on
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, the Court wrote: "In a dem-
ocratic society privacy of communication is essential . . . . Fear or suspicion
that one's speech is being monitored by a stranger, even without the reality
of such activity, can have a seriously inhibiting effect upon the willingness to
voice critical and constructive ideas."11s In other words, the Bartnicki case
involved competing First Amendment concerns-the right to publish infor-
mation of pubic importance and the chilling effect on speech resulting from
the permitted publication of illegally recorded conversations.119
Nevertheless, the Court held that the statute was not sufficiently narrow
as applied to these facts.120 First of all, the "usual" way of preventing the
111. Id. at 520, n.3 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c) (1996)).
112. See id. at 518; id. at 541 (Breyer, J., concurring).
113. Id. at 519 (majority opinion).
114. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 525.
115. See Rodney A. Smolla, Information As Contraband: The First Amendment and
Liability for Trafficking in Speech, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 1099, 1118 (2002) ("As-
tonishingly, at no point in Justice Stevens's opinion does the Court come right
out and say what standard of review or doctrinal test it is applying to
the laws before it."); but see Katy J. Lewis, Comment, Bartnicki v. Vopper: A
New Bully in the Schoolyard of Private Expression, 70 TENN. L. REv. 859, 864
(2003) ("[T]he majority implicitly opined the appropriate level of review to be
that of strict scrutiny.").
116. See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 529-30.
117. See id. at 532-33.
118. Id. at 533.
119. See id. ("[Ilit seems to us that there are important interests to be considered on
both sides of the constitutional calculus.") (emphasis in original).
120. See id. at 533-34.
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theft of information is to punish the thief.121 In most of the cases prosecuted
under the federal wiretapping statute, the Court noted, the identity of the wire
tapper is known.1 22 Ultimately, the Court stated, "In these cases, privacy con-
cerns give way when balanced against the interest in publishing matters of
public importance."23 Despite such sweeping dicta, the Court added, "We
need not decide whether [the] interest [in privacy of communication] is
strong enough to justify the application of § 2511(c) to disclosures of trade
secrets or domestic gossip or other information of purely private concern."24
Interestingly, no lower court has ever reached a conclusion similar to Bart-
nicki, even if there were similar facts.125
The concurrence in Bartnicki is especially important for at least three
reasons. First, the concurring opinion is likely the most accurate statement of
the law.1 26 As Justice Scalia has argued, a concurring opinion "can assuredly
narrow what the majority opinion holds, by explaining the more limited in-
terpretation adopted by a necessary member of that majority."27 This argu-
ment clearly applies to a decision like Bartnicki, in which three Justices
dissented and two Justices concurred.128 Second, the concurring opinion in
Bartnicki is a more analytically sound opinion than the majority opinion;
thus, courts will likely find the concurring opinion easier to apply.129 Finally,
the two-Justice concurrence agreed with the three-Justice dissent on certain
121. Id. at 530.
122. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 530.
123. See id. at 517, 534 (The Court's ambiguous reference to "[t]hese cases" proba-
bly refers just to the lower courts' decisions in Bartnicki, not to "these kinds of
cases.").
124. Id. at 533.
125. See Eric B. Easton, Ten Years After: Bartnicki v. Vopper As A Laboratory for
First Amendment Advocacy and Analysis, 50 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 287, 334
(2011) (although Professor Easton wrote his article in 2011, there are no cases
since 2011 applying the Bartnicki decision straightforwardly to similar facts).
126. See id. at 333 ("In assessing the impact of Bartnicki on the future development
of First Amendment doctrine, one may choose to adopt the expansive reading
given the majority opinion by the dissent or the narrow reading given in the
concurrence.").
127. McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 462 n.3 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
see also Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Ste-
vens, JJ.)) ("[T]he holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by
those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.").
128. See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 535, 541.
129. See Easton, supra note 125, at 333 (noting that "Justice Stevens's opinion is so
poorly crafted as to leave in doubt" basic questions about how to apply it).
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key matters, giving those matters the votes of five Justices and, thus, prece-
dential authority.130
Writing for the concurrence, Justice Stephen Breyer interpreted the ma-
jority's opinion narrowly.131 Unlike Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for the
majority, Justice Breyer was more explicit about what standard the Court was
applying.132 "What this Court has called 'strict scrutiny,"' he wrote, "is nor-
mally out of place where, as here, important competing constitutional inter-
ests are implicated."l33 Instead, Justice Breyer adopted an ad hoc balancing
test that was closer to intermediate scrutiny.134 He was much more optimistic
about the statute than the majority, praising it for "directly enhanc[ing] pri-
vate speech."35 Indeed, he wrote, "[T]he threat of . .. widespread dissemina-
tion [of private information] can create a far more powerful disincentive to
speak privately than the comparatively minor threat of disclosure to an inter-
ceptor and perhaps to a handful of others."36
In the case at hand, however, the private speech Bartnicki and Kane
sought to protect was particularly ill-favored and, at the same time, particu-
larly valuable for the public to hear.137 Borrowing language from Fourth
Amendment "reasonable search and seizure" jurisprudence,138 Justice Breyer
argued that Kane and Bartnicki had "no legitimate interest in maintaining the
privacy of the particular conversation."139 Kane, unlike the writers of the
emails in the Sony incident, discussed committing a serious violent crime.140
Justice Breyer quoted the Restatement of Torts, stating that there is a "gen-
eral privilege to report" threats of violent crime and that this privilege ex-
130. See id. at 334 (noting that "a majority of Justices (two concurring and three
dissenting) accept[ed] an effective intermediate scrutiny standard").
131. See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 535 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("I agree with [the ma-
jority's] narrow holding limited to the special circumstances present here.").
132. See id. at 536.
133. Id.
134. See id.
135. Id. at 537.
136. Id.
137. See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 539 (Breyer, J., concurring).
138. Compare id. at 537, with United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984)
("A chemical test that merely discloses whether or not a particular substance is
cocaine does not compromise any legitimate interest in privacy.") (emphasis
added).
139. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 539 (Breyer, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
140. Id.
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tends to "invasion of privacy" torts.14 1 After observing that Kane and
Bartnicki were "limited public figures,"42 Breyer cautiously concluded:
Thus, in finding a constitutional privilege to publish unlawfully
intercepted conversations of the kind here at issue, the Court does
not create a "public interest" exception that swallows up the stat-
utes' privacy-protecting general rule. Rather, it finds constitu-
tional protection for publication of intercepted information of a
special kind. Here, the speakers' legitimate privacy expectations
are unusually low, and the public interest in defeating those ex-
pectations is unusually high. Given these circumstances, along
with the lawful nature of respondents' behavior, the statutes' en-
forcement would disproportionately harm media freedom. 143
Although Justice Breyer's opinion may read like a concurrence in the
judgment, the opinion is actually a full concurrence intended as an interpre-
tive gloss.144 No Supreme Court statement can command a majority without
the votes of five Justices;145 however, the Bartnicki concurrence is the most
reliable statement of the law, regardless of whether it is understood as a con-
141. Id.
142. Id. (borrowing the term "limited public figure" from constitutional libel law);
see, e.g., Lorain Journal Co. v. Milkovich, 474 U.S. 953, 963 (1985) (assessing
whether the plaintiff in a libel suit was a "limited-purpose public figure"). Con-
stitutional libel cases also discuss "general purpose public figures." See Tavou-
lareas v. Piro, 817 F.2d 762, 772 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("A person becomes a
general purpose public figure only if he or she is 'a well-known "celebrity," his
name a "household word."' " . . . Tavoulareas is a highly prominent individual,
especially in business circles, but his celebrity . . . does not approach that of a
well-known athlete or entertainer.") (quoting Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publ'ns,
Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). In the Sony situation, some of the
people who wrote the stolen emails were probably "general public figures," but
not all of them. Sony itself was probably not a "general public figure" because
corporations are almost never considered to be "general public figures." See
Computer Aid, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 56 F. Supp. 2d 526, 535 (E.D. Pa.
1999) (holding that Hewlett-Packard was not a general purpose public figure
despite being "one of the largest and most influential corporations in the world
with one of the most actively traded stocks on the New York Stock
Exchange").
143. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 540 (Breyer, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
144. Id. at 535 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("I join the Court's opinion.").
145. See McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 462 n.3 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I
have never heard it asserted that four Justices of the Court have the power to
fabricate a majority by binding a fifth to their interpretation of what they say,
even though he writes separately to explain his own more narrow
understanding.").
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currence in judgment or as an interpretive gloss.146 If the concurrence dis-
agrees with the majority, then the concurring opinion solely concurs in the
judgment.1 47 Therefore, "the holding of the Court may be viewed as that po-
sition taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the nar-
rowest grounds."48 But if the concurrence is a full concurrence (as Justice
Breyer's opinion claims), then Justice Stevens must have implicitly seen the
concurrence as being compatible with his own, rather vague, majority opin-
ion.149 Either way, the concurring opinion should guide any interpretation of
the majority opinion in Bartnicki because the majority opinion would not be
a majority opinion without the two concurring Justices' votes.15 0
Interpreted in light of the concurring opinion, Justice Stevens's majority
opinion is much narrower than it appears at first glance.15, A reader can re-
solve the ambiguities by taking the majority and concurring opinions as be-
ing in tandem.152 Thus, when Justice Stevens wavered between strict and
intermediate scrutiny, the reader must assume that he eventually chose not to
apply strict scrutiny.153 Even assuming that Justice Stevens had strict scrutiny
in mind, it cannot be true, except superficially, that "the majority . . . opined
the appropriate level of review to be that of strict scrutiny."154 A majority of
the Justices-the two concurring Justices and the three dissenting Justices-
explicitly said that the appropriate standard was intermediate scrutiny.55 The
Court observed that the reasoning of the majority applied only "given the
146. See id.
147. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
148. Id. (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)).
149. See McKoy, 494 U.S. at 462 n.3 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("If the author of the
[majority] opinion finds what the 'glossator' says inconsistent with his own
understanding of the opinion, he may certainly decline, at the outset of the
opinion, to show that Justice as joining.").
150. See id.
151. See Easton, supra note 125, at 334 (noting, perhaps for this reason, that some
early scholarly readers of Bartnicki "saw Bartnicki as an immediate victory for
the press, but a longer term victory for privacy interests").
152. See id. at 333.
153. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 525-26 (2001) ("We agree with peti-
tioners that § 251 1(1)(c) . . . is in fact a content-neutral law of general applica-
bility. . . . On the other hand, the naked prohibition against disclosures is fairly
characterized as a regulation of pure speech."); see also DVD Copy Control
Ass'n, Inc. v. Bunner, 75 P.3d 1, 12 (Cal. 2003) (The Bartnicki majority "did
not conclude that . . . a prohibition [of pure speech] should be subject to strict
scrutiny.").
154. Lewis, supra note 115.
155. See Easton, supra note 125, at 335.
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facts of these cases."156 Therefore, any part of an opinion seemingly to the
contrary, the reader must construe as dicta or at least not supported by a
majority of the Court.157
Indeed, Justice Stevens tempered his broad rhetoric by implying that the
First Amendment permits remedies for disclosure of certain kinds of infor-
mation.158 Moreover, Justice Stevens noted: "[W]e acknowledge that some
intrusions on privacy are more offensive than others, and that the disclosure
of the contents of a private conversation can be an even greater intrusion on
privacy than the interception itself."l59 The Court hinted that the First
Amendment allows Congress to prohibit the disclosure of lawfully obtained
stolen information, even if the prohibition does not discourage stealing the
information in the first place.160 The Court even conjectured that such a pro-
hibition would be allowed in "most" cases.161 The majority ended its opinion
by broadly concluding "that a stranger's illegal conduct does not suffice to
remove the First Amendment shield from speech about a matter of public
concern."62 A reader must conclude, however, that "a matter of public con-
cern" means only, in this context, "a matter of unusual public concern,
namely, a threat of potential physical harm to others."63 A company in
Sony's position should be encouraged by this implied limitation on Bart-
nicki's holding. In light of the Bartnicki concurrence, "the Court's holding
does not imply a significantly broader constitutional immunity for the media"
than under the facts of Bartnicki.164
At least four key facts distinguish Bartnicki and the Sony incident. First,
and most importantly, no information from the Sony data contains threats of
unlawful activity.165 Second, in the Sony incident, media outlets elected to
pursue the stolen information directly by going to a URL provided by the
hackers and entered a password.166 By contrast, in Bartnicki, the wire tapper
gave the files to Yocum, who gave them to Vopper, who then used them on
156. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 529.
157. See, e.g., id. at 534 (quoting Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right
to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 214 (1890)) ("The right of privacy does not
prohibit any publication of matter which is of public or general interest.").




162. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 535 (majority opinion).
163. Compare id. at 535, with id. at 536 (Breyer, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
164. Id. at 536 (Breyer, J., concurring).
165. See generally id.
166. See Guardians of Peace (GOP) Release Sony CEO Outlook Data File with
Threat to Movie Goers, supra note 7 (describing how the stolen "files were
distributed [by the hackers] in a secured . . . file" so that media outlets would
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his show.i67Third, Sony did not knowingly participate in a pre-existing public
controversy.1 6 8 Before Sony's files were stolen, no public controversy ex-
isted. 169 Finally, in Bartnicki, the parties did not dispute whether Vopper ac-
quired or possessed the files unlawfully.170 A business in Sony's situation
would not likely make that concession. By applying Bartnicki narrowly, a
court would likely have no difficulties distinguishing the facts of Bartnicki
from an incident like Sony's. 17
III. TnE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
A. Lower Courts Apply Bartnicki Narrowly
Lower courts, indeed, have applied the Bartnicki holding narrowly when
they have applied the holding at all.172 A few of these courts have seized
upon Justice Stevens's statement that "[w]e need not decide whether that
interest is strong enough to justify the application of § 2511(c) to disclosures
of trade secrets or domestic gossip or other information of purely private
concem."I73
For instance, in DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, the Supreme Court
of California held that a court can enjoin a person from posting stolen trade
secrets online, even if that person did not steal the trade secrets himself.174
Andrew Bunner, a website operator, published the computer code used by a
DVD company to encrypt copyrighted material.175 In ruling against Bunner,
the court noted that it was not sufficient that the code had "some link to a
public issue," specifically, the debate surrounding DVD encryption.176 The
court reached its conclusion despite acknowledging that computer code is
speech generally protected by the First Amendment.177 Thus, Bunner shows
that courts may not hesitate to distinguish Bartnicki based on Justice Ste-
have needed to enter a password supplied by the hackers to access the
information).
167. See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 519.
168. See id. at 518.
169. See id.
170. See id. at 525.
171. See id.
172. A WestlawNext search revealed that, although 184 cases have cited Bartnicki,
only 43 cases have discussed Bartnicki in depth as of October 23, 2015. See id.;
see also, e.g., DVD Copy Control Ass'n, Inc. v. Bunner, 75 P.3d 1, 14-15 (Cal.
2003).
173. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 533; Bunner, 75 P.3d at 14-15.
174. Bunner, 75 P.3d at 14-15.
175. See id. at 6-8.
176. Id. at 16.
177. See id. at 10-11.
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vens's "purely private concern" limitation.178 Importantly, a court could clas-
sify many, if not most, of the documents at issue in the Sony incident as
"trade secrets."l79
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals also relied, in a surprising way, on
Justice Stevens's "purely private concern" limitation in Quigley v. Rosen-
thal.180 In Quigley, Bear, the Aronsons' family dog attacked the Quigleys'
family dog, which set an acrimonious dispute into motion.181 At the height of
the feud, the Aronsons illegally recorded several conversations of the
Quigleys including one between Mrs. Quigley and her friend, Katie
Ughetta.18 2 During the conversation, Mrs. Quigley joked about burning a
cross on the Aronsons' roof in order to burn down their house.183 In another
recorded conversation, Mr. Quigley made anti-Semitic comments.'8 Yet an-
other time, Mr. Quigley pretended to hit Mrs. Aronson with his car, but he
swerved away at the last moment.185 In response to all of this, the Aronsons,
who were Jewish, contacted the Anti-Defamation League (ADL).186 Saul Ro-
senthal, director of Denver's ADL, called a meeting at which he accused the
Quigleys of anti-Semitism, partially drawing on information obtained from
the illegally-recorded conversations.187 Rosenthal later repeated his accusa-
tions on a radio show.188 In response, the Quigleys sued Rosenthal, among
others, for violating the same statute at issue in Bartnicki.189 The Court held
that, notwithstanding Bartnicki, the First Amendment did not protect Rosen-
thal's speech.1 90
Quigley illustrates just how broadly courts have interpreted the "purely
private concern" limitation in Bartnicki and, thus, how narrowly courts have
interpreted the Bartnicki holding.191 The Quigley court stated that "the con-
tent of the Quigleys' intercepted telephone conversations were not matters of
178. Id. at 16.
179. Id.
180. Quigley v. Rosenthal, 327 F.3d 1044, 1067-68 (10th Cir. 2003).
181. See id. at 1048.
182. See id. at 1049.
183. See id. at 1050.
184. See id. at 1052.
185. See id. at 1051.
186. See Quigley, 327 F.3d at 1051.
187. See id. at 1053-54.
188. See id. at 1054.
189. See id. at 1062-63.
190. See id. at 1067-68.
191. Id.
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public concern."92 The court concluded the conversations were not a public
concern despite the facts that: Mr. Quigley made anti-Semitic comments; 193
Mrs. Quigley joked about burning down the Aronsons' house; 19 4 and Rosen-
thal's comments were made in the context of a federal complaint against the
Quigleys for racial harassment.'95 The court was also not swayed by the fact
that Rosenthal himself did not illegally record the conversations.196 Although
racial discrimination can, in some contexts, be "a matter inherently of public
concern,"97 discrimination is only a public concern when allegations of ra-
cial discrimination or harassment are "colorable."98
In Quigley, the ADL should have known the racial harassment allega-
tions had no legal merit.199 Above all, "the Quigleys were engaging in what
they thought was private discussion with each other or with friends and fam-
ily regarding their ongoing dispute with the Aronsons."200 In other words, the
court considered the Quigleys' subjective knowledge of their own conversa-
tions' nature to be highly significant.201 Unlike Bartnicki, in which Bartnicki
and Kane presumably knew that the union negotiations were a matter of pub-
lic concern, the Quigleys did not know that the whole town would soon be
talking about the Quigleys' alleged anti-Semitism.202 Thus, the Quigleys did
not "voluntarily engage .. . in a public controversy."203 Like a potential me-
dia defendant in the Sony incident, a party seeking First Amendment protec-
tions (such as the Aronsons) could not claim a pre-existing public
controversy exist.204 The Sony producer, Rudin, similar to Mr. Quigley, did
not know until after his emails were published, that the country would be
talking about his workplace grievances against Jolie.205
Other ways in which courts have distinguished Bartnicki are also in-
structive. In Commonwealth v. F.W., for instance, the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts summarily assumed that Bartnicki should be applied nar-
192. Quigley, 327 F.3d at 1067.
193. See id. at 1050.
194. See id. at 1049.
195. See id. at 1080.
196. See id. at 1049.
197. Id. at 1060 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 n.8 (1983)).
198. Quigley, 327 F.3d at 1061 (citing Kemp v. State Bd. of Agric., 803 P.2d 498,
504 (Colo. 1990)).
199. See id.
200. Id. at 1067.
201. See id. at 1069.
202. See id.
203. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 539 (2001) (Breyer, J., concurring).
204. Id. at 539 (Breyer, J., concurring).
205. See id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
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rowly.206 Quoting both the majority and concurrence of Bartnicki, the court
wrote that the Bartnicki opinion "must be viewed in context with the facts of
the Bartnicki case."207 The court summarily distinguished Bartnicki, observ-
ing that, "[h]ere, [unlike in Bartnicki,] we are not concerned with a public
threat."208
In Boehner v. McDermott, John and Alice Martin, in violation of the
federal wiretapping act, recorded a conference call that included Republican
United States Representative John Boehner and the Republican Speaker of
the House, Newt Gingrich.209 The Martins gave the tape to Democratic Rep-
resentative Jim McDermott, who, in turn, gave the New York Times access
to the tape.210 It was undeniable that "[t]he contents of the tape had substan-
tial news value."211 Speaker Gingrich, in fact, had recently been charged with
an ethics violation by the House Ethics Subcommittee.212 The New York
Times reported that during the call, "The politicians agreed among them-
selves how they could use their opponents' comments to attack the [ethics]
subcommittee's findings indirectly without technically violating the agree-
ment that Mr. Gingrich's lawyers made with the ethics subcommittee."213
The Boehner court assumed that Representative McDermott obtained
the tape lawfully.214 Nevertheless, the court found that to punish Representa-
tive McDermott for disclosing the information did not violate the First
Amendment.215 At the outset, the court confidently stated that Bartnicki,
"does not stand for the proposition that anyone who has lawfully obtained
truthful information of public importance has a First Amendment right to
disclose that information."216 The court cited seven statutes that would be
206. See Commonwealth v. F.W., 986 N.E.2d 868, 873 (Mass. 2013).
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. See Boehner v. McDermott, 484 F.3d 573, 575 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
210. See id. at 576.
211. Id.
212. See Adam Clymer, Gingrich Is Heard Urging Tactics in Ethics Case, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 10, 1997), http://www.nytimes.com/1997/01/10/us/gingrich-is-
heard-urging-tactics-in-ethics-case.html.
213. Id.
214. See Boehner, 484 F.3d at 577. In the Sony situation, Sony could likely argue
that the media outlets did obtain their data illegally.
215. Id. at 579.
216. Id. Taking Bartnicki literally, this statement by the Boehner court seems plainly
incorrect. As this comment argues, however, one must read the Bartnicki ma-
jority opinion in light of the Bartnicki concurrence. Compare id. with Bartnicki,
532 U.S. 514, 534 (2001) ("In these cases, privacy concerns give way when
balanced against the interest in publishing matters of public importance").
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invalidated if the holding of Bartnicki stood for such a proposition.217 Next,
the court stated that, as a member of the House Ethics Committee, Represen-
tative McDermott had a "special" duty to not disclose the tape to the me-
dia.218 Once he accepted a position in the House Ethics Committee,
Representative McDermott gave up some of his First Amendment protec-
tions.219 Interestingly, the court held that his position made McDermott lia-
ble, not only before the ethics board, but also to civil sanctions under the
federal wiretapping statute.220 Although the facts of the Boehner case are, in
many ways, inapposite to the Sony incident, it is apparent that the D.C. Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals also read the Bartnicki decision narrowly.221
Dahistrom v. Sun-Times Media, LLC, a recent case discussing Bartnicki,
also read the Bartnicki majority opinion narrowly.222 In Dahlstrom, R.J.
Vanecko, a nephew of a former mayor of Chicago, allegedly beat up and
killed a man named David Koschman.223 The Chicago Sun-Times criticized
the police department's handling of the case. 224 According to the Chicago
Sun-Times, the police department placed Vanecko in a line-up containing
only "fillers," or police officers who looked remarkably similar to
Vanecko.225 Because of this, the Chicago Sun-Times argued, the line-up was
likely to be inaccurate.226 In order to prove this argument, the Chicago Sun-
Times published an article that contained "not only the lineup photographs
and the Officers' full names, but also the months and years of their birth,
217. See Boehner, 484 F.3d at 578.
218. See id. at 579 (citing United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (1995)).
219. See id.
220. See id. at 580 (In Aguilar, "the defendant-judge was punished not for violating
his ethical duty to maintain judicial secrecy, but for violating the general prohi-
bition on disclosing investigative searches.").
221. The fact that a majority of the Boehner Court stated that Bartnicki would have
applied absent ethical rules forbidding McDermott from disclosing the tape to
the media does not change this conclusion. See Boehner, 484 F.3d at 586 (Sen-
telle, J., dissenting) (this portion of the dissenting opinion controlled a major-
ity). Because he was discussing circumventing the House Ethics Committee,
Speaker Gingrich had very little legitimate expectation of privacy. See Bart-
nicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. at 539 (Breyer, J., concurring). Moreover, the con-
versation was obviously of unusually high public importance. See id.
Regardless, the portion of the Boehner opinion theorizing that Bartnicki would
have applied under different facts is, by definition, dicta.
222. See generally Dahlstrom v. Sun-Times Media, LLC, 777 F.3d 937 (7th Cir.
2015).
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their heights, weights, hair colors, and eye colors."227 The identified officers
sued the Chicago Sun-Times, alleging a violation of the Driver's Privacy
Protection Act (DPPA).228 The DPPA states, "It shall be unlawful for any
person knowingly to obtain or disclose personal information . . . from a mo-
tor vehicle record."229
Dahlstrom differed from Bartnicki, because in Dahistrom, the Chicago
Sun-Times both unlawfully obtained the information and published the infor-
mation.230 The court concluded that the information published by the Chicago
Sun-Times was the type of "personal information" contemplated by the legis-
lature. 23 1 Furthermore, the Dahistrom court held that the Chicago Sun-Times
could be punished for publishing the information as well as obtaining the
information.232 Because of the statute, the Dahistrom court treated these acts
as two separate offenses.233
The Dahlstrom court's construction of Bartnicki is surprisingly nar-
row. 2 34 Indeed, the Dahlstrom opinion interpreted Bartnicki even more nar-
rowly than it could have in order to reach the same result. As the Dahistron
court noted, the Supreme Court in Bartnicki explicitly left open the question
of "whether, in cases where information has been acquired unlawfully by a
newspaper [,] . . . government may ever punish not only the unlawful acquisi-
tion, but the ensuing publication as well."235 The Dahistrom court, then,
could have simply held, when the information is unlawfully obtained, a thief
of information cannot receive First Amendment protection for publishing the
stolen information.
Instead, the court applied the intermediate-scrutiny balancing test ap-
plied by the Bartnicki Court.236 The court acknowledged that the Chicago
Sun-Times article concerned a matter of great public importance.237 Never-
theless, the Dahistrom court stated that the illegal information did not really
contribute to the Chicago Sun-Times article.238 After all, the Chicago Sun-
227. Id.
228. See Dahlstrom, 777 F.3d at 941.
229. See id. (quoting 18 U.S.C.A. § 2722(a) (West 1994)) (emphasis added).
230. See id. at 946.
231. Id. at 945.
232. See id. at 946.
233. See id.
234. See generally Dahlstrom, 777 F.3d at 937.
235. Id. at 951-52 (quoting Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 528 (2001)).
236. See id. at 953 ("We conclude, however, that the balance in the instant case tips
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Times obtained a picture of the line-up from a legal source. 239 Although pri-
vate information about the officers in the line-up might add to the force of
the argument that the police department was correct, the effect of such infor-
mation was "negligible" since the most of the force of the paper's argument
stemmed from lawfully obtained information.240 Thus, considered individu-
ally, the personal details at issue in Dahlstrom were "of less pressing public
concern than the threats of physical violence in Bartnicki."241 Significantly,
echoing the Bartnicki concurrence, the Dahlstrom court considered "threats
of physical violence" to be the baseline for "pressing public concern."242
The Dahistrom court's approach to the matter of public concern ques-
tion is markedly different from the Supreme Court's approach in Florida
Star.243 In Florida Star, the Supreme Court had to decide whether a rape
victim's name in an article about the crime was a matter of public concern. 244
In Florida Star, the Court wrote, "It is, [sic] clear . . . that the news article
concerned 'a matter of public significance [as] . . . the article generally, as
opposed to the specific identity contained within it, involved a matter of para-
mount public import."245 By contrast, the Dahlstrom court carefully isolated
the personal information from the news article as a whole, which the court
admitted concerned a matter of public importance.246
One way of reading the Dahistrom opinion is that the Dahlstrom court
applied a less stringent "public concern" analysis than the Florida Star Court
because the information in Dahlstrom was illegally obtained.247 The Dahl-
strom court concluded, "[I]n context, the significance of the Officers' per-
sonal information does not rise to the level of the threats of physical violence
at issue in Bartnicki, and therefore does not override the government's sub-
239. See id. at 941.
240. The information did add some force to the arguments. For instance, while the
photos were in black and white, the personal information revealed that at least
some of the officers had the same eye color as Vanecko. See Dahlstrom, 777
F.3d at 953.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 953-54.
243. See generally Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
244. See id. at 537.
245. Id. at 536-37 (emphasis added) (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'n Co., 443
U.S. 97, 103 (1979)).
246. See Dahlstrom, 777 F.3d at 953.
247. To be specific, the Dahlstrom court, like the Bartnicki Court as clarified by the
concurrence, was applying intermediate scrutiny, rather than strict scrutiny. See
id. at 954 ("[W]e conclude with respect to the first prong of the intermediate
scrutiny analysis, that the government's asserted interests are both important
and furthered by the DPPA's prohibition on disclosure.") (emphasis added).
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stantial interest in privacy protection."248 The Dahistrom court claimed to be
applying the majority's Bartnicki test, but the test applied was closer to the
Bartnicki concurrence's test.24 9 Indeed, the Dahlstrom court cited the Bart-
nicki concurrence extensively.250 Quoting Justice Breyer's comments cabin-
ing Bartnicki to its facts, the Dahlstrom court wrote,
Because the Officers' privacy expectations in their personal infor-
mation are significantly greater-and the public value of that in-
formation is significantly lesser-than in Bartnicki, a ruling in
Sun-Times's favor would represent a substantial extension of
Bartnicki's "narrow holding," . . . separate and apart from the
other distinguishing features of the instant case. 2 5 1
The Dahistrom case is the latest in an almost unbroken line of cases inter-
preting Bartnicki narrowly and regarding the Bartnicki concurrence as having
equal footing with the majority opinion.252
The reasoning of the Dahistrom court should apply with extra force to
the Sony incident. In Dahlstrom, the Chicago Sun-Times reported on politi-
cal corruption in the Chicago police force.253 The story was larger than the
personal information itself.254 In the Sony incident, by contrast, media outlets
reported on information within the private communications themselves.255
The stolen information generated the entire story. 256 Unlike Dahlstrom257 and
Bartnicki,258 in the Sony incident, there was no pre-existing public
controversy.
The closest straightforward application of Bartnicki to similar facts is
Jean v. Massachusetts State Police.259 Even in this case, however, the court
seemed to read Bartnicki narrowly. In Jean, Paul Pechonis's "nanny cam"
recorded a video of eight armed police officers charging into Pechonis's
248. Id. at 953-54 (emphasis added).
249. See id. at 953.
250. See, e.g., id. at 953 n.11.
251. Id. (quoting Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 540 (2001) (Breyer, J.,
concurring)).
252. See Dahlstrom, 777 F.3d at 953 n.1 1.
253. See id. at 940.
254. See id.
255. See Perlroth, supra note 4.
256. See id.
257. See Dahlstrom, 777 F.3d at 940 (corruption in the context of a police
investigation).
258. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 518-19 (2001) (heated union
negotiations).
259. Jean v. Mass. State Police, 492 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2007).
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house and conducting an unwarranted search.260 Pechonis gave the video to
Mary Jean, who operated a website critical of the local police force.261 After
Jean published the video on her website, the state police threatened to charge
her under a state statute that forbade posting illegally obtained audio record-
ings.262 The court held that Bartnicki clearly applied to this situation.263 How-
ever, the court noted that "the privacy interests discussed in Bartnicki are less
compelling here."264 In Bartnicki, the plaintiffs had a private conversation.2 65
In Jean, by contrast, "the intercepted communications involve a search by
police officers of a private citizen's home in front of that individual, his wife,
other members of the family, and at least eight law enforcement officers."266
Thus, the privacy interests weighed by the Bartnicki Court were "virtually
irrelevant" to Jean.267 Furthermore, in Jean, unlike the Bartnicki case or the
Sony incident, the court knew the identity of the interceptor, Pechonis.268 As
the Jean court observed, "there is a better argument for prosecuting a subse-
quent publisher of information when the interceptor is anonymous."269 Fi-
nally, the court identified hearing about unwarranted searches and potential
police misconduct as an unusually strong, legitimate public interest, a fact
that the police officers in Jean did not contest.2 70 Notably, the Jean court
interpreted the Bartnicki concurrence as binding law, apparently accepting
the police officers' argument that "the concurring justices [in Bartnicki]
joined the other four justices in the majority only because the scope of the
decision is strictly limited to its particular facts."271 Unlike the Sony incident,
Jean involved potentially unlawful conduct in front of several people.272 All
of the aforementioned cases decided after Bartnicki show that the Supreme
Court would likely apply Bartnicki narrowly if confronted with Sony's
situation.
260. See id. at 25.
261. See id.
262. Id. The police department originally asked her to remove the whole video, but,
after examining the statute in greater detail, the department later informed her
that she would not be in violation if she removed the audio. Id. at 26.
263. See id. at 27.
264. Id. at 29 (emphasis added).




269. Id. (emphasis in original).
270. See id.
271. Brief for Appellants at 22, Jean, 492 F.3d 24 (No. 06-1775), 2006 WL
4015582; see also Jean, 492 F.3d at 33.
272. See Jean, 492 F.3d at 30.
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B. WikiLeaks: A First Amendment Testing Ground
The WikiLeaks situation273 likely serves as a good indication of how a
court would rule if confronted with Sony's situation.274 As legal scholar Pro-
fessor Eric Easton put it:
[I]f one reads Bartnicki as imposing strict scrutiny when review-
ing any restriction on the dissemination of unlawfully obtained,
but publicly important information, where the disseminator did
not participate in the unlawful acquisition, then WikiLeaks is
home free. On the other hand, if one reads Bartnicki as a case of
ad hoc balancing, then the Court will ultimately have to decide
whether the freedom to publish without fear of sanction is out-
weighed in this case by national security, as opposed to personal
privacy, considerations.275
The WikiLeaks situation, however, is different from the Sony incident in a
number of ways. First, and most importantly, the government's interest in
maintaining secrecy for national security is presumably higher than Sony's
interest in maintaining personal privacy.276 On the other hand, the public in-
terest in WikiLeaks' information is probably higher than the public interest in
reading the private correspondences of Sony's executives.277 Assuming Bart-
nicki mandates an ad hoc balancing test (as this comment argues), a court
possibly, even likely, would not allow sanctions against WikiLeaks but
would allow Sony to pursue sanctions against media outlets who published
its stolen data. Nevertheless, looking at situations involving the Espionage
273. See Who's Behind WikiLeaks, NPR (Apr. 8, 2010), http://www.npr.org/tem-
plates/story/ story.php?storyld= 125731952.
274. Moreover, the government has so far never prosecuted any mainstream journal-
ist under the Espionage Act. See Derigan A. Silver, National Security and the
Press: The Government's Ability to Prosecute Journalists for the Possession or
Publication of National Security Information, 13 COMM. L. & POL'y 447, 463
(2008).
275. Easton, supra note 125, at 333 (emphasis added).
276. Sony's interest, however, in a smoothly-running workplace is also quite high.
See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 720 (1987) (acknowledging a govern-
ment employer's need for "the efficient operation of the workplace."). Justice
Joseph Story recognized the importance of private business dealings early in
our nation's history. See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 346 (C.C.D. Mass.
1841) ("[T]he general rights incident to property, belong to the writer [of let-
ters, including] letters of business . . . . A fortiori, third persons, standing in no
privity with either party, are not entitled to publish them . . .").
277. See Daniel P. Paradis, Bartnicki v. Vopper: Cell Phones and Throwing Stones,
37 NEw ENG. L. REV. 1117, 1142 (2003) ("Under Justice Breyer's approach,
... direct illegal interception by the media could perhaps be outweighed by the
fact that the contents of the communication reveal egregious acts or plots by
'all-purpose' public figures (e.g., congressmen).").
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Act, like the WikiLeaks situation, can still shed light on how to apply the
First Amendment to the publication of stolen data.
i. Case Law
Only one case so far has examined the First Amendment's limitations
on seeking sanctions against WikiLeaks and the plaintiff was a private entity,
not the Government.278 In Bank Julius Baer & Co. v. WikiLeaks, a bank
sought to enjoin WikiLeaks from disclosing further confidential bank infor-
mation.279 The trial court issued a temporary restraining order against
WikiLeaks, which kept WikiLeaks from publishing the plaintiffs' confiden-
tial information.280 Deciding not to issue a permanent injunction, the court
wrote a short opinion with few details.281 In coming to its conclusion, the
court stated, "[T]here is evidence in the record that 'the cat is out of the bag'
and the issuance of an injunction would therefore be ineffective to protect the
professed privacy rights of the bank's clients."282 In other words, WikiLeaks
had a substantial likelihood of a successful First Amendment defense.283 The
court did not mention whether Bartnicki applied.284
The factual issues in WikiLeaks are clearly different from those in a
publication of stolen data case. 2 85 Nevertheless, Sony or any other company
seeking damages for the publication of stolen data can take at least two les-
sons from the WikiLeaks case. First, a court will not likely allow an injunc-
tion against the publication of stolen data.286 The court would possibly see an
injunction as a prior restraint of speech requiring strict scrutiny.287 Thus,
Sony would be limited to seeking damages after the publication of the data.
Second, because "the cat [would be] out of the bag," Sony will likely be
278. This is not surprising, because WikiLeaks is a foreign non-profit operating
overseas. See Who's Behind WikiLeaks, supra note 273.
279. Bank Julius Baer & Co. Ltd v. WikiLeaks, 535 F. Supp. 2d 980, 982 (N.D. Cal.
2008).
280. See id. at 983.
281. Id. at 985.
282. Id. at 985 (citing In re Charlotte Observer, 921 F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir. 1990)).
283. See id. at 984-85.
284. See generally id. at 980.
285. See WikiLeaks, 535 F. Supp. 2d at 984-85 (WikiLeaks merely received the
information).
286. See id. at 985.
287. See id. at 983. It is also possible, however, that a court would not see this as a
"classic" prior restraint of speech, because Sony would only be trying to pre-
vent publication of information to the extent that it was obtained illegally. See
Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 33 (1984). Presumably, if Rudin
forwarded his email concerning Jolie to Entertainment Weekly, he would not
complain when they published it.
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unable to sue subsequent re-publishers.288 As the WikiLeaks court observed, a
"law that restricts speech must directly advance the state interest involved
and may not be sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote support for
that purpose."289 In suing the publisher of the stolen information, then, Sony
should be careful to point out that, until media outlets began to publish the
stolen information, the information was not easily accessible to lay people.290
The hackers in the Sony situation posted the password-protected documents
online and only sent the password to specific people.291
ii. Scholarly Literature
The scholarly literature on the WikiLeaks case and the Espionage Act is
more enlightening for evaluating future cases. Analyzing whether the gov-
ernment could punish journalists under the Espionage Act, Professor Derigan
Silver concluded that the answer is uncertain.292 First, Professor Silver noted
that in the Pentagon Papers case, the Court did not say whether the United
States could pursue a cause of action against the media after the classified
documents were published.293 The Pentagon Papers case, as Professor Silver
noted, stands for the proposition that prior restraints are constitutionally dis-
favored.294 Moreover, he argued, the Supreme Court has "consistently ruled
that national security is a government interest of the highest order."295 As
such, Silver could not determine whether courts would protect media re-pub-
lishers of stolen government data.296
Notably, scholars agree that Bartnicki requires ad hoc balancing when
the possession of the stolen materials is illegal.297 At least two legal scholars
have seemed to characterize Bartnicki's majority holding as "a fragile and
extremely narrow holding."298 Professor Richard Shoop finds that Bartnicki's
288. See WikiLeaks, 535 F. Supp. 2d at 985.
289. Id. (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557, 564 (1980)).
290. See Guardians of Peace (GOP) Release Sony CEO Outlook Data File with
Threat to Movie Goers, supra note 7.
291. See id.
292. See Silver, supra note 274, at 481-82 ("It would be unwise to rely on the
courts to protect journalists in these situations").
293. See id. at 452.
294. See id.
295. Id. at 481.
296. See id. at 481-82.
297. See id. at 456-57.
298. Silver, supra note 274, at 456-57 (citing Richard D. Shoop, Bartnicki v. Vop-
per, 17 BERKELY TECH. L.J. 449, 465 (2002); Mark Feldstein, The Jailing of a
Journalist: Prosecuting the Press for Receiving Stolen Documents, 10 Comm.
L. & POt'Y 137, 174 (2005)).
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"holding is vague and difficult to apply since the critical tests for 'informa-
tion of public concern' and 'publication' are undefined."299 Professor
Shoop's observation is especially apt in light of the Bartnicki concurrence. 300
Many scholars agree that whether the First Amendment would protect
WikiLeaks is an open question, even though the publication of its informa-
tion certainly regards a matter of public concern. 301
IV. APPLYING THE LAW TO SONY AND SIMILARLY-SITUATED
COMPANIES
A. What Statutes Apply?
To predict how First Amendment jurisprudence applies to media outlets
publishing data hacked from a company such as Sony, it is important first to
determine which statutes to use. Fortunately, it is not necessary to guess what
statutes Sony would use because Sony has already threatened to sue under
specific statutes. 302 Mr. Boies wrote a letter to Twitter stating:
The possession, use, and publishing of the [information stolen
from Sony] implicates numerous federal and California state laws,
including, but not limited to, the Computer Fraud & Abuse Act
(18 U.S.C. § 1030), the Copyright Act (17 U.S.C. §§ 501, et seq.),
the California Comprehensive Computer Data Access & Fraud
Act (Cal. Penal Code § 502), California's Stolen Property Law
(Cal. Penal Code § 496), the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (Cal. Civ.
Code §§ 3426, et seq.), and the California Unfair Competition
Law (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq.), among others,
especially when such actions are taken knowingly in furtherance
of federal and state crimes committed by the perpetrators, includ-
ing extortion.303
Apart from the First Amendment issues, Sony's biggest hurdle in holding
media outlets, in addition to the hackers, responsible will likely be proving
that these statutes apply to publishers of stolen data. Nevertheless, Sony and
other companies could lobby Congress to create statutes that would expressly
allow Sony to seek damages from publishers of stolen private information.
Aside from the current section, this comment focuses on the constitutional
299. Shoop, supra note 298, at 464.
300. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 541 (2001) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(agreeing with the Court's holding, but stating, "I would not extend that hold-
ing beyond these particular circumstances").
301. See Silver, supra note 274, at 481; see also Shoop, supra note 298, at 465.
302. See David Boies, Letter from Gen. Counsel, Sony Pictures Entm't, to Vijaya
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limits of what a business could do assuming the necessary statutory
apparatus.
Moreover, Sony could likely make a colorable argument that at least
some of these statutes apply.304 For instance, the California Comprehensive
Computer Data Access & Fraud Act (3CDAFA) makes it a crime to
"[k]nowingly access and without permission . . . use[ ] any data ... in order
to . . . wrongfully control or obtain money, property, or data."30 The
3CDAFA broadly defines "data" as "a representation of information, knowl-
edge, facts, concepts, computer software, computer programs or instruc-
tions."306 The 3CDAFA acknowledges that data can be in any form, e.g.,
storage media.307 The statute's express purpose supports its potential applica-
tion to the Sony situation.308 The statute's purpose states in relevant part as
follows:
The Legislature . .. finds and declares that protection of the integ-
rity of all types and forms of lawfully created . . . computer data is
vital to the protection of the privacy of individuals as well as to
the well-being of [businesses] . . . within this state that lawfully
utilize . . . computers, computer systems, and data. 309
As the preamble indicates, the purpose is to protect lawfully created com-
puter data broadly.
Other statutes suggest that Sony could argue that merely possessing the
documents is illegal. For instance, California's Uniform Trade Secrets Act
(UTSA) may apply to publishers and hackers of stolen information.310 The
UTSA creates civil remedies for "misappropriation" of trade secrets.31' The
Act defines "misappropriation" to include conduct such as the "acquisition of
a trade secret of another by a person who knows or has reason to know that
the trade secret was acquired by improper means."312 Similarly, California's
Stolen Property Law declares that "[elvery person who . . . receives any
property that has been stolen or that has been obtained in any manner consti-
tuting theft or extortion, knowing the property to be so stolen or obtained . . .
shall be punished."313
304. The letter from David Boies discusses these statutes. See supra note 12.
305. CAL. PENAL CODE § 502(c)(1) (West 2012).
306. Id. § 502(b)(8).
307. Id.
308. Id. § 502(a).
309. Id.
310. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3426-3426.11 (West 2012).
311. See id. § 3426.3.
312. Id. § 3426.1(b)(1) (emphasis added).
313. CAL. PENAL CODE § 496(a) (West 2014).
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Further, a business may seek criminal punishment against hackers. The
California Penal Code defines "property" to include "money, goods, chattels,
things in action, and evidences of debt."314 Although the California courts
have not specifically addressed the issue, other states have held that com-
puter data can be "goods, wares, or merchandise," for the purposes of a "sto-
len goods" statute.315 In United States v. Riggs, the court stated that it would
be absurd to hold a printout of computer data to be "goods" but not an elec-
tronic file containing the same data.316 A printout of computer data would
obviously be "goods," though.317 Although Riggs is not binding on state
courts, the Riggs decision illustrates how easily a court could apply a "stolen
property" statute to electronic data.318 Even if a state's stolen property law
does not currently apply to electronic information, Congress or a state legis-
lature could certainly intervene.
As a purely statutory matter, then, Sony will likely be able to pursue
penalties against publishers of its data under several statutes.3 19 Moreover,
Sony indicated it would argue that media outlets through the act of publish-
ing are furthering the hackers' plan to extort Sony.320 After all, the journalists
sought out the stolen information by using a URL and password provided by
the hackers.321
B. What Stolen Information is the Media Outlet Seeking to Publish?
The kind of information that is published dictates whether the law can
constitutionally punish media outlets. As the New York Times reported on
the Sony incident, "Everything and anything had been taken. Contracts. Sal-
ary lists. Film budgets. Medical records. Social Security numbers. Personal
emails. [And] Five entire movies, including the yet-to-be-released 'An-
314. Id. § 7(10), (12) (West 2014).
315. See United States v. Riggs, 739 F. Supp. 414, 420 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
316. Id. at 421 ("[I]n the instant case, if the information ... had been ... printed out
. . ., then [the defendant]'s transfer . . would clearly constitute the transfer of
'goods, wares, or merchandise' . . . . This court sees no reason to hold differ-
ently simply because [the defendant] stored the information inside computers
instead of printing it out on paper.").
317. See id.
318. See id.
319. This comment does not address the Copyright Act. The complex intersection of
copyright law and the First Amendment is outside of the scope of this
comment.
320. See David Boies, supra note 302.
321. See Guardians of Peace (GOP) Release Sony CEO Outlook Data File with
Threat to Movie Goers, supra note 7.
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nie.' "322 The information hackers obtained from Sony (and could obtain from
other businesses) divides into four major categories: trade secrets, personal
information, personal emails, and "copyrightable information."323 If future
hackers obtain information relating to a business's unlawful, violent, or
wrongful activities, the following analysis may not apply.3 24
i. Trade Secrets
Sony claims that at least some of the information stolen from the com-
pany constituted "trade secrets." 325 Although it mentions "trade secrets," the
Bartnicki Court does not define the term.326 The California UTSA, however,
defines a trade secret as:
[I]nformation, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program,
device, method, technique, or process, that:
(1) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from
not being generally known to the public or to other persons who
can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and
(2) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circum-
stances to maintain its secrecy.327
At least forty-two states and the District of Columbia have adopted some
version of the UTSA.328 California courts interpreted "trade secret" broadly
and found many types of information, including "information related to cost
and pricing," can constitute "trade secrets."329 Thus, Sony could make a
strong argument that much of the disclosed data, such as Sony's film budgets
322. Michael Cieply & Brooks Barnes, Sony Cyberattack, First a Nuisance, Swiftly
Grew into a Firestorm, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2014, at Al, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/12/31/business/media/sony-attack-first-a-nuisance-
swiftly-grew-into-a-firestorm-.html.
323. This comment will examine the first three categories and exclude copyrightable
information; see David Boies, supra note 302; cf Silver, supra note 274.
324. It seems clear, even under the concurring opinion in Bartnicki, that media out-
lets reporting on illegal activities would be protected under the First Amend-
ment. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 536 (2001) (Breyer, J.,
concurring). On the other hand, the Bartnicki opinion does not address how a
court should rule if the media outlet itself acquired the information unlawfully,
even when the information relates to illegal activities. Silver, supra note 274, at
463.
325. See David Boies, supra note 302.
326. See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 533.
327. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d) (West 2012).
328. Milton E. Babirak, Jr., The Maryland Uniform Trade Secrets Act: A Critical
Summary of the Act and Case Law, 31 U. BALT. L. REV. 181, 188 (2002).
329. Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 277, 287 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
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and marketing information, constitutes "trade secrets."330 Finally, Sony might
argue that its movie scripts are "trade secrets," but typically movie scripts are
better protected as "literary works" under copyright law.331
Courts have yet to define the relation between the First Amendment and
trade secrets. The Bartnicki Court explicitly removed "trade secrets" from its
holding, although it did not say how trade secrets may affect the analysis. 3 3 2
In Bunner, however, the California Supreme Court affirmatively held that
"[t]he First Amendment does not prohibit courts from incidentally enjoining
speech in order to protect a legitimate property right."333 Applying this ratio-
nale, the court held that the First Amendment does not preclude enjoining
Bunner from publishing the computer code a DVD company used to encrypt
DVDs.334
Bunner sought protection by arguing that he regularly "discuss[ed] and
debate[d]" copyright issues and only used the computer code as an illustra-
tion in his debates.335 The court seemed to concede that his debates over
DVD encryption were, indeed, public debates.336 In rejecting Bunner's argu-
ment, the court distinguished Bartnicki and argued that a matter of public
concern does not equate to a legitimate public interest in the secret's publica-
tion.337 Specifically, the DVD encryption code was not "inextricably inter-
twined" with Bunner's contribution to the public debate on DVD
encryption.338 The court said the Daily Mail cases do not apply "where, as
here, the 'sensitive information rests in private hands' or the information was
obtained unlawfully."339
A court would likely apply a similar analysis to the Sony incident if
Sony were able to prove that "trade secrets" were stolen and published.
While, colloquially speaking, there is a general public interest in knowing
more about Sony, Sony also has a strong property interest in protecting its
330. See id.
331. 17 U.S.C. § 101; see Silvaco Data Sys. v. Intel Corp., 109 Cal. Rptr. 3d 27, 45
(Cal. Ct. App. 2010), as modified on denial of reh'g (May 27, 2010), abrogated
on other grounds by Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 246 P.3d 877 (Cal.
2011).
332. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533 (2001) (majority opinion).
333. DVD Copy Control Ass'n, Inc. v. Bunner, 75 P.3d 1, 14 (Cal. 2003).
334. See id. at 19.




339. Bunner, 75 P.3d at 16 n.7 (quoting Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 535 n.8
(1989)).
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trade secrets. 340 Trade secrets are inherently not conversations, like the con-
versation at issue in the Bartnicki decision.341 In Bartnicki, "unusually low"
legitimate expectations of privacy existed when Kane and Bartnicki dis-
cussed blowing up porches.342 In the Sony incident, on the other hand, unusu-
ally high legitimate expectations of privacy exist with respect to Sony's
control over its trade secrets. 343 As in Bunner, revelation of Sony's trade
secrets would not substantially add to any public discussion of Sony's busi-
ness practices.344 If a court prevents the publication of trade secrets, the pub-
lic can still criticize the company seeking to preserve those trade secrets. 345
Thus, Sony, under the First Amendment, could prevent publication of its sto-
len trade secrets. 346
ii. Personal Information
In the Sony incident, hackers also stole salary information, Social Se-
curity numbers, and other purely personal data.347 The First Amendment
would almost certainly permit Sony to pursue sanctions against publishers of
such information. 348 Sony could prevent media outlets from publishing per-
sonal information for three reasons. First, the Bartnicki majority opinion ex-
plicitly excluded "information of purely private concem."349
Second, the reasoning of the Dahistrom court better suits the Sony inci-
dent than even the facts of the Dahistrom case. If information about one's
birthday, height, weight, hair color, and eye color constitutes "purely private"
information, then surely information about one's salary, phone number, ad-
dress, and social security number does as well.35 0 Indeed, the latter informa-
tion is even more "purely private;" unlike a Social Security number, someone
can tell another person's height, weight, hair color, and eye color just by
340. See id. at 13-14.
341. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 540 (2001) (Breyer, J., concurring).
342. See id.
343. After all, trade secrets are by definition valuable secrets that derive their value
at least in part from being secret. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d) (West 2012).
344. See Bunner, 75 P.3d at 16.
345. Richard A. Epstein, Privacy, Publication, and the First Amendment: The Dan-
gers of First Amendment Exceptionalism, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1003, 1043 (2000).
346. See Bunner, 75 P.3d at 16.
347. See Cieply & Barnes, supra note 322.
348. See Dahlstrom v. Sun-Times Media, LLC, 777 F.3d 937, 941 (7th Cir. 2015).
349. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533 (2001) (majority opinion).
350. See Dahlstrom, 777 F.3d at 941.
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looking at the other person. 351 Furthermore, as in Dahistrom, whether the
information provides additional fodder for a pre-existing public conversation,
such as entertainment business compensation, does not matter.352 Given in-
formation is already publically and legally available about these issues, the
newly revealed personal information adds little to the overall debate on en-
tertainment business compensation.353
Finally, like the police officers in Dahistrom, Sony could argue that the
media outlets illegally obtained or possessed their information.354 After all,
the journalists who first published Sony's stolen information navigated to
URLs provided by the hackers and entered a password provided by the hack-
ers. 3 55 A court would likely conclude, then, that the First Amendment does
not prevent Sony from suing publishers of its employees' personal
information.
iii. Personal Emails
The Sony hackers also stole work-related emails sent by both Sony ex-
ecutives and celebrities.356 In one of the exchanges, Rudin discussed not
wanting to helm a film starring Jolie.357 "I'm not remotely interested in pre-
siding over a $180m ego bath that we both know will be the career-defining
debacle for us both," he wrote.358 In another email, Rudin jokingly suggested
Amy Pascal, a Sony studio co-chair, ask President Barack Obama if he
would finance a film.359 "Should I ask him if he liked DJANGO?" she wrote,
351. Cf Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 540 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that "there is
little expectation of privacy in mundane facts about a person's life") (citation
omitted).
352. See Dahlstrom, 777 F.3d at 953.
353. See, e.g., The World's Most Powerful Celebrities, FORBES (last visited Mar. 12,
2015), http://www.forbes.com/celebrities/list/#tab:overall.
354. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 496 (West 2014); see also Dahlstrom, 777 F.3d at
949.
355. See Guardians of Peace (GOP) Release Sony CEO Outlook Data File with
Threat to Movie Goers, supra note 7.
356. See Cieply & Barnes, supra note 322.
357. Alex Stedman, Leaked Sony Emails Reveal Nasty Exchanges and Insults, VARI-
ETY (Dec. 9, 2014), http://variety.com/2014/film/news/leaked-sony-emails-re-
veal-nasty-exchanges-and-insults-I1201375511/.
358. Id.
359. Variety Staff, Sony's Amy Pascal Apologizes for Obama Emails, VARIETY
(Dec. 11, 2014), http://variety.com/2014/film/news/sonys-amy-pascal-apolo-
gizes-for-obama-emails-not-who-i-am-1201377177/.
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referencing a film about slavery.360 These politically incorrect exchanges are
typical of the more scandalous emails.361
The public was certainly interested in reading about these exchanges.362
Nevertheless, as this comment argues, the Bartnicki concurring opinion rep-
resents the most accurate statement of the current law.363 In sum, under the
concurrence's test, Sony likely has a strong and legitimate interest in keeping
its sensitive business correspondences private.364 Moreover, compared to the
threats of physical violence at issue in Bartnicki, it is not "unusually" in the
public interest to read insensitive a movie executive's insensitive,jokes.365
Therefore, a court should not hold that the First Amendment prohibits Sony
from seeking remedies from publishers of its business emails. Moreover,
even under the plain language of the majority opinion in Bartnicki,366 Sony
could argue that it should be able to seek remedies against publishers of its
stolen personal emails.
The majority opinion in Bartnicki explicitly left open the question of
"whether, in cases where information has been acquired unlawfully by a
newspaper or by a source, government may ever punish not only the unlaw-
ful acquisition, but the ensuing publication as well."367 In Bartnicki, the
Court assumed that the publisher of the information acted legally.368 By con-
trast, Sony will likely argue that the publishers of the information acted ille-
gally by knowingly receiving stolen property and acting in furtherance of
extorting Sony.369 The Bartnicki majority also left open the question of
whether its holding applied to matters "of purely private concem."370 Be-
cause Rudin and Pascal's comments were arguably racist and sexist,371 one
360. Id.
361. See Stedman, supra note 357.
362. See generally Stephanie Pappas, Oscar Psychology: Why Celebrities Fascinate
Us, LIVESCIENCE (Feb. 24, 2012, 2:06 PM), http://www.livescience.com/
18649-oscar-psychology-celebrity-worship.html (discussing the breadth and
reasons of celebrity obsession).
363. See supra notes 155, 239, 297, and accompanying text.
364. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 540 (2001) (Breyer, J., concurring).
365. See id.
366. Id. at 535 (majority opinion).
367. Id. at 528 (emphasis in original) (quoting Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 535
n.8 (1989)).
368. See id. at 525.
369. See David Boies, supra note 302.
370. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 533.
371. See Guardians of Peace (GOP) Release Sony CEO Outlook Data File with
Threat to Movie Goers, supra note 7; Variety Staff, Sony's Amy Pascal Apolo-
gizes for Obama Emails, VARIETY (Dec. 11, 2014), http://variety.com/2014/
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could easily assert that they involved a matter of public concern. However,
lower courts have not applied the Bartnicki decision in this manner. In
Quigley, Mr. Quigley made anti-Semitic statements. 372 Nevertheless, the
Quigley court characterized the Quigleys' conversations as "private discus-
sion[s] with each other or with friends and family."373 The Quigleys did not
intentionally thrust themselves into a public discussion, and neither did Ru-
din or Pascal. "[R]acial discrimination" becomes "inherently of public con-
cern," only when a complainant has made colorable "allegations of racial
discrimination/harassment."374 Unlike the Quigley case, the Sony incident
lacks allegations of racial discrimination or harassment at all, much less col-
orable allegations.375 Furthermore, unlike the Bartnicki case, Rudin and Pas-
cal were not "limited public figures."376 Rudin and Pascal did not
"voluntarily engage[ ] in a public controversy," and the mere production of a
movie is unlikely to constitute "a public controversy."377 The production of a
movie is public, but not necessarily controversial. Similarly, Rudin's emails,
while arguably controversial, were not public.
Besides, before this controversy, Rudin and Pascal were probably not
famous enough to constitute "general public figures."378 Their names were
not "household words." 379 Moreover, Sony itself is not a general public fig-
ure, because courts rarely if ever consider corporations to be general public
figures.380 It is true that some of the emails in the Sony incident were likely
written by "general public figures, but the public figure analysis is not a
decisive factor in the Bartnicki Court's "purely private concern" analysis.
The Bartnicki majority does not even mention "public figures," even though
a "public figure" analysis likely factors into the majority's "public concern"
analysis.381 Moreover, the Constitution does not "require[ ] . . . anyone, in-
cluding public figures, to give up entirely the right to private communication,
film/news/sonys-amy-pascal-apologizes-for-obama-emails-not-who-i-am- 1201
377177/.
372. See Quigley v. Rosenthal, 327 F.3d 1044, 1052 (10th Cir. 2003).
373. Id. at 1067.
374. Id. at 1061.
375. Id. at 1067.
376. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 539 (2001) (Breyer, J., concurring).
377. Id.
378. See Tavoulareas v. Piro, 817 F.2d 762, 772 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
379. See id.
380. See Computer Aid, Inc., v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 56 F. Supp. 2d 526, 535 (E.D.
Pa. 1999).
381. This, at least, was apparently Justice Breyer's interpretation of the majority's
opinion. See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 540 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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i.e., communication free from ... interceptions."382 Therefore, even under the
vague standards put forward by the Bartnicki majority, Sony could seek rem-
edies against publishers of its private business emails.
Furthermore, modem hacktivists, such as the hackers in the Sony inci-
dent, differ significantly from the wire tappers the government prosecuted
under the federal wiretapping statute. 383 As the Bartnicki majority explained,
"With only a handful of exceptions, the violations of [the wiretapping stat-
ute] that have been described in litigated cases have been motivated by either
financial gain or domestic disputes."384 Hacktivists, by contrast, seek social
or political change.385 By definition, their illegal scheme includes attempting,
to reach a wide audience.386
Furthermore, the Bartnicki majority explained, "In virtually all of th[e]
cases [prosecuted under the wiretapping act], the identity of the person or
persons intercepting the communication has been known."387 For the modern
hacktivist, this will not necessarily be true. Even when the government can
identify the hackers, this does not guarantee that the hackers will be arrested
or make their arrest easier.388 In the Sony incident, for instance, the United
States claims to possess evidence proving the North Korean government's
involvement. 389 Although the Bartnicki Court did not view the nature of the
criminal third party as decisive, a court assessing Sony's situation may dis-
tinguish the hackers from the wire tapper involved in the Bartnicki case.390 If
a business in Sony's situation cannot sue the publishers of its data, the com-
pany will be left without a remedy.
As indicated above, Sony has an even stronger argument under the Bart-
nicki concurrence: "[T]he Court does not create a 'public interest' exception
that swallows up the statutes' privacy-protecting general rule."391 "Rather,
[the Court] finds constitutional protection for publication of intercepted in-
382. Id.
383. See Boehner v. McDermott, 484 F.3d 573, 575 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
384. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 530.
385. See Xiang Li, Hacktivism and the First Amendment: Drawing the Line Between
Cyber Protests and Crime, 27 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 301, 308 (2013).
386. See Sanger & Perlroth, supra note 2.
387. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 530.
388. See, e.g., Nicole Perlroth, Russian Arrested in Guam on Array of U.S. Hacking
Charges, N. Y. TIMES: BITS BLOG (July 7, 2014, 5:23 PM), http://bits.blogs.ny
times.com/2014/07/07/russian-arrested-in-guam-on-array-of-u-s-hacking-char
ges/?r-0 (discussing the rarity of arresting hackers based in Russia).
389. Sanger & Perlroth, supra note 2.
390. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 540 (Breyer, J., concurring).
391. Id.
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formation of a special kind."392 In Bartnicki, Vopper prevailed only because
the "speakers' legitimate privacy expectations [were] unusually low, and the
public interest in defeating those expectations [was] unusually high."393
The Sony incident is the exact reverse. Although the public might show
interest in the inner workings of a major corporation, the public has an un-
usually low legitimate interest in this kind of gossip, unless the company
engages in illegal or wrongful conduct.394 The exception does not apply be-
cause emails revealed in the Sony incident do not discuss illegal or legally
wrongful activities.395 Ultimately, the emails discussed work, albeit at times
in a scandalous manner.396 On the other side of the scale, Sony enjoyed an
unusually high legitimate expectation of privacy in discussing sensitive busi-
ness decisions in private communications.397 Therefore, a court applying the
Bartnicki concurrence (which is the law and which most courts have seemed
to apply) would almost certainly permit Sony to pursue remedies against
publishers of its stolen emails.
V. CONCLUSION
Cyber-attacks on businesses will probably increase in frequency as ter-
rorist organizations become more technologically savvy. The FBI, for in-
stance, warned that the self-styled Islamic State will likely mount cyber-
attacks against U.S. businesses.398 Furthermore, the relative success of the
Sony hacks is likely to embolden future hackers.399 This is an entirely new
situation, in that businesses will be unable to punish the information thieves
themselves.400 In light of these considerations, the First Amendment should
392. Id. (emphasis added).
393. Id.
394. See id. at 533 (majority opinion) (excluding "domestic gossip" from the Bart-
nicki Court's holding).
395. See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 346 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
396. See sources cited supra note 371.
397. See id.; Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 346.
398. See Robert Windrem, FBI Warns of Possible Cyberattacks in Retaliation for
U.S. Strikes on ISIS, NBC NEWS (Sep. 26, 2014), http://www.nbcnews.com/
storyline/isis-terror/fbi-warns-possible-cyberattacks-retaliation-u-s-strikes-isis-
n21282 1.
399. After initially deciding to pull "The Interview," Sony instead opted to release
the film "in a small number of theaters." See Brooks Barnes & Michael Cieply,
Sony, in About-Face, Will Screen 'The Interview' in a Small Run, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 24, 2014, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/24/busi-
ness/media/sonys-the-interview-will-come-to-some-theaters-after-all.html.
400. Compare Guardians of Peace (GOP) Release Sony CEO Outlook Data File
with Threat to Movie Goers, supra note 7 ("Within a couple of hours of posting
this article [about the Sony attacks], my server was hit with a massive attack
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not prevent Congress or the states from dis-incentivizing media publication
of stolen data and private information. Despite the Bartnicki majoity opin-
ion,401 neither the First Amendment nor Supreme Court case law prevents
Sony or others from seeking remedies against media outlets attempting to
publish their stolen private information.
To be clear, the Constitution limits what Sony, or a similarly situated
business, could do to vindicate their "freedom not to speak publically."402
First, businesses likely could not sanction publication of true information,
which was originally lawfully obtained.403 If a journalist overheard Pascal
making a racist joke in public, the journalist has the prerogative to publish
Pascal's conversation. Second, businesses likely could not prevent the publi-
cation of legally wrongful or illegal speech with no legitimate expectation of
privacy even if the information were obtained illegally.404 If a journalist re-
ceived an illegal recording of an executive threatening to blow up a competi-
tor's house, it would be the journalist's constitutional right and, arguably,
moral duty to publish the conversation. Third, businesses likely could not
prevent an author from publishing information that was already widely dis-
seminated.405 If the author of a law review article wanted to quote from a
widely-available email sent by Rudin, it would be the author's prerogative to
use the email as an example. On the other hand, statutes reasonably tailored
to protect a business's interest in privacy will actually protect speech. As the
Bartnicki concurrence observed, "[T]he threat of ... widespread dissemina-
from [an] IP address ... out of Korea .. . . After blocking the single attack
from Korea, the traffic switched over to a three-way attack from Hong Kong
and China."), with Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 530 (2001) ("In virtually
all of th[e] cases [under the wiretapping statute], the identity of the person or
persons intercepting the communication has been known.").
401. See, e.g., Roger Yu, Sony Warns Media Not to Publish Hacked E-mails, USA
TODAY (Dec. 15, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2014/
12/15/sony-wants-publishers-to-stop-hacked-email-stories/20427989/ (incor-
rectly summarizing the holding of Bartnicki as "a media organization cannot be
held liable for publishing information illegally obtained by a third party"); but
see Shoop, supra note 298, at 464 (concluding that "Bartnicki's ultimate use-
fulness [to protect the media] is limited because the vagueness of the holding
invites future challenges likely to result in an even more restricted holding").
402. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559 (t985)
(quoting Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 244 N.E.2d 250, 255
(N.Y. 1968)) (emphasis in original).
403. See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 27 (1984) (finding it signifi-
cant that the publication of information was restricted only to the extent it was
discovered in a certain way).
404. See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 539 (Breyer, J., concurring).
405. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557, 564 (1980).
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tion [of private information] can create a . .. powerful disincentive to speak
privately."4 06
None of this suggests that suing media outlets should be a business's
first recourse when its data is stolen. After all, "an Ounce of Prevention is
worth a Pound of Cure."407 Sony's employees sued the company for failing to
keep their personal data secure.408 This is likely just the tip of the iceberg
with respect to these kinds of employee lawsuits. Whether or not the allega-
tions of the Sony employees are well founded, strong cyber security is the
best protection against disclosure of private information.
Moreover, business should weigh the strong prudential and ethical rea-
sons against suing over the disclosure of just any information. Ethically,
businesses should refrain from silencing the media. Prudentially, in attempt-
ing to recover damages caused by the confidential materials' disclosure, busi-
nesses might call more attention to the damaging information.409
If taking legal action is in their best interest, businesses should remain
free, nevertheless, to sue publishers. Confidential communications are essen-
tial to the efficient operation of any business. Pursuing claims against pub-
lishers of confidential information might be, in some cases, the only way to
mitigate the disclosure of information that businesses need to keep private.
Courts should not interpret the First Amendment to leave victims of cyber-
attacks without a remedy.
406. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 537 (Breyer, J., concurring).




408. See Class Action Complaint, Corona v. Sony Pictures Entm't, Inc., No. 2:14-
cv-09600 (C. D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2014).
409. See Evgeny Morozov, Op-Ed., Living with the Streisand Effect, N.Y. TMES
(Dec. 26, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/26/opinion/26iht-edmoro
zov.1.18937733.html (describing this phenomenon as "the Streisand Effect,"
after Barbara Streisand who, in trying to suppress online pictures of her house,
called additional attention to the pictures).
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